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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BACKMAN, 
a Taxpayer for himself and for all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUN,TY, 
a body corporate and politic, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9697 
Statement of facts by appellant is not contested. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
1THE CASE OF LEHI 'CITY V. MElLING MAY NOT BE 
CONTROLLING. 
In the case of Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U. 237, 48 
P.2d 530, the Metropolitan Water District Act, Title 73, 
Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953 was held consti-
tutional. The Civic Auditorium Act, Title 11, Chapter 
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11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was patterned upon the 
water district act. 
We shall refer hereafter to the above case as the 
Lehi case. 'The decision was a three to two decision. The 
Justices gave opinions as follows: Folland's majority 
opinion was concurred in by Hansen only. \Volfe con-
curred specially. Moffat dissented and Hanson concurred 
with the dissent. 
The fact that it was a split decision; the fact that 
none of those Justices is presently on the bench and 
the fact that some of the reasons given in the majority 
and specially concurring opinions are inapplicable to the 
civic auditorium, make the controlling effect of the Lehi 
case questionable. Other reasons why the LehiJ case n1ay 
not control are as follows: 
Some questions raised in this case were not decided 
by the Lehi case, either because they were not raised 
as issues, or because such issues were not present because 
of significant differences between the two acts, which 
differences are hereafter discussed. 
The majority opinion in the Lehi case stressed the 
fact that water is of tremendous importance to the 
political bodies in the State of Utah, and there may have 
been an element of necessity in the reasoning behind the 
decision in the Lehi case, causing the court to disre-
gard constitutional objections because of the paramount 
nece,ssity of obtaining water. Such compelling need is 
not present in this civic auditorium case. 
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The cities in the Lehi case could not obtain water 
without combining their efforts, and did not have the 
power to combine their efforts without a water district, 
whereas, in this case, the civic auditorium district area 
is coterminous with that of the county, and the county 
(except for a constitutional debt limit) could accomplish 
what any civic auditorium district could acomplish. 
POINT II. 
IF THE DISTRICT IS A SPECIAL COMMISSION, PRI-
VATE CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION, THE ~CT WOULD 
VIOLATE ARTICLE 6, SECTION 29, OF THE STATE CON-
STITUTION. (APPELLANT'S POINT 1.) 
Artile 6, Section 29 provide'S : 
"The legislature shall not delegate to any spe-
cial commission, p·rivate corporation or associa-
tion, any power to make, supervise or imterfere 
with any municipal ~'mprovement, money, property 
or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to 
levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform 
any munict"pal funct~ons." 
The act provides the district is authorized to : 
(a) J\tlake, construct and supervise a civic auditorium 
(which is a "municipal improvement") (11-11-2, 11-11-13). 
(b) Control money for and from the operation there-
of (so the district "supervises money") (11-11-13). 
(c) Levy taxes (11-11-13). 
All of these are activities under this section. The ques-
tion to be resolved therefore, is whether or not the dele-
gation of the above powers is a delegation to a "special 
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cornmission, private corporation or association." Factors 
indicating the district does come under such classifica-
tion are as follows: 
(a) The board is not elected but is rather appointed 
to office (11-11-15). 
(b) :Members of the board need not be residents of 
either the city they represent or of the district (11-11-
15). 
· (c) The members of the board are responsible to no 
one, neither the persons who appointed them nor the 
voters of the district, and continue in office indefinitely 
(11-11-15 ). 
In Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 
Utah 536, 271 P. 961, it was held that the Public Utilities 
Commission could not regulate the rate to be charged 
by Logan City for electricity furnished by a city owned 
plant. The court said, in discussing Article 6, Section 29: 
"We think it clear that the undoubted pur-
pose of the constitutional provision is to hold in-
violate the right of local self-government of cities 
and towns with respect to municipal improve-
ments, money, property, effects, the le;vying of 
taxes, and the performance of municipal func-
tions. Stress, however, is laid on the words in 
the section of the Constitution, 'special commis-
sion,' that the power shall not be delegated to a 
special commission, and that the Public Utilities 
Commission is a general and not a special commis-
sion, and hence whateve·r power may have been 
delegated to the commission in such respect is 
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not in violation of such constitutional provision, 
to support which the case of Public Serv;ice Com-
mission v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 P. 24 
is especially cited. That case so holds. But we 
think such a construction of the section is too nar-
row, and one which in effect impairs the very 
essence and purpose of it, deprives cities and 
towns oi local self-government, and interferes 
with their power to levy taxes and in the perform-
ance of their municipal corporate affairs with 
respect to tl1eir improvements, property and mu-
nicipal functions. Town of Holyoke v. Sm~th, 75 
Colo. 286, 226 P. 159." 
In a concurring opinion the following was said: 
"That the people of Utah, when they adopted 
section 29 of article 6 of the state· Constitution, 
intended to limit the power of the legislative 
branch of government, so as to prevent the dele-
gation of the power to perform municipal func-
tions, or the power to supervise or interfere with 
municipal property, to any commission outside the 
municipal fold, and that they thereby manifest 
an intention, which must be respected by the 
courts, that municipal property shall remain un-
der the supervision and control of, and municipal 
functions shall be per£ormed by, municipal of-
ficials, who are amenable to the will of the inhabi-
tants of the municipalities, so long as municipal 
corporations continue to exist and that section 
remains a part of the fundamental law, are propo-
sitions about the soundness of which I have no 
doubt." 
In the Lehi case (supra) the question as to whether 
or not the district was 'a "special commission" was raised. 
·The majority opinion (p. 535) gave no reason hut merely 
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said the district was not a "special cmnmission". ::Jlr. 
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion (p. 547), looked 
at the function of the district to determine if the district 
was a "special commission", and said that the definition 
of ''special commission" 
"may therefore take content, not so much from 
its intrinsic meaning,, as from the nature and 
powers of the duties which are given to it. But 
a Metropolitan \Vater District appears to he de-
signed not to interfere with municipal affairs but 
as a me.ans to further them." 
He went on to conclude that since the immense water pro-
jects were not within the capabilities of cities, they were 
therefore not municipal functions and consquently a 
district is not a ''special commission." Although Judge 
Wolfe's reasoning is hard to follow, inasmuch as he 
seems to be confusing the definition of "special commis-
sion" with the acts done by such commision, both of 
which are covered by this constitutional section, it is 
apparent that had the water projects been of such size 
that the combined efforts of cities was not necessary, 
Judge Wolfe would have held that the act violated this 
section of the constitution. In the subsequent case of 
Provo City v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, 48 P.2d 555, where 
only one city was involved in 1a district, and therefore 
there could be no combined efforts of cities, Judge Wolfe 
relied on the necessity of combined efforts of water dis-
tricts. Again the combined efforts of political bodies 
was the basis of his decision. No such combined efforts 
are contemplated by the auditorium act and therefore 
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the reasoning of Judge Wolfe's concurring opinion, which 
made the majority opinion the majority rather than the 
minority opinion, is inapplicable here. 
POINT III. 
IF THE DISTRI,CT IS NOT A "SPECIAL COMMISSION" 
THEN IT MUST BE A MUNICIPAL COR,PORATION, OTHER,.. 
WISE ARTICLE 13, SECTION 5, OF THE CONSTITUTION 
]S VIOLATED. (APPELLANT'S POINT VII.) 
Article 13, Section 5, provides : 
''The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in 
the corporate. authorities thereof, respectively, the 
power to ,assess and collect t,axes for all purposes 
of such corporation." 
This section allows the powers of taxation to be 
exercised only by certain bodies. The only classification, 
under which the water district could fall is the classifica-
tion of municipal corporation. In order to exercise the 
powers of taxation it must be a municipal corporation. 
If it is a municipal corporation, then the debt limitation 
of a municipal corporation set out under Article 14, Sec-
tions 3 and 4 discussed in Point V, would be violated. 
Furthermore, the levying of taxes for county pur-
poses is limited by this constitutional provision to the 
corporate authorities of the county as pointed out in 
State vs. Standford, 24 U. 148, 66 P. 1061, 1064, wherein 
the ·Court said: 
"Under the Constitution the state has no 
power to make a disposition of county funds, and 
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require that they be appropriated for other and 
different purposes than those for which by au-
thority of the county they were collected. San Luis 
Obispo Co. v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71, 23 Pac. 1032. 
In our opinion section 5, art. 13, of the Constitu-
tion, not only limits local or county taxation to 
local county purposes, but it was also intended 
as a limitation upon the power of the legislature 
to grant the right or impose the duty of creating 
a debt or levying .a tax to any person or body other 
than the corporate authorities of the county." 
The building :and operation of a civic auditorium is 
a municipal function which the county itself, except for 
the debt limitation of the constitution, could undertake 
without the creation of a separate district. The building 
and operation of an auditorium is a local county purpose 
for which the county authorities alone are authorized 
to levy taxes, under the above construction. 
POINT IV. 
A SPE'CIAL LAW WOULD VIOLATE ARTICLE 11, SEC-
TION 5, ARTICLE 6, SECTION 26 AND ARTICLE 1, SEC-
TION 24 OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT'S 
POINTS II AND X.) 
Said Sections provide in part : 
Article 1, Section 24 : 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." 
Article 6, Section 26 : 
''The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following cru:;es: 
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"11. Regulating county and township af-
fairs ... 
"16. Granting to an individual, association 
or corporation any privilege, immunity or fran-
chise ... 
"In all cases where a general law can be 
applicable, no special law shall be enacted . " 
Article 11, Section 5 : 
'• Corporations for municipal purposes shall 
not be created by special laws ... " 
The act is a special law in that it applies only to 
counties having a population in excess of 250,000 and 
thus does not have general application (11-11-2, 11-11-
3). The only county to which it is presently applicable 
is Salt Lake County. Had the act allowed every county 
within the state to create such districts, it may then have 
been a general law with a specific purpos·e instead of a 
special law with a special or specific purpose. In Lehi 
City vs. Mdling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530, 547, Mr. Jus-
tice Wolfe in his concurring opinion, said: 
"·The Legislature could not pass an act specif-
ically directed at Salt Lake City or some other 
particular municipality." 
In State vs. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 898 
the Court said : 
''As pointed out in that case, our statute re.-
quires that all laws shall operate uniformly wher-
ever uniform laws can be enacted. While it is 
true that this court, in common with others, has 
repeatedly held that legislative subjects may be 
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classified and that legislative classification should 
not be interferred with by the courts unless such 
classification is clearly fanciful, capricious, arbi-
trary, or unnatural, yet, where such is the case, 
it becomes the duty of the courts to uphold the 
constitutional rights and privileges in that re-
gard." 
Evidently the support of legislators representing 
sparsely populated counties was obtained by placing 
the population limitation therein so that if Salt Lake 
County wants an auditorium, it can have it, without any 
effect on the other counties. 
If the act providing for construction and operation 
of a civic auditorium is of a general nature, then Article 
1, Section 24 is violated. 
If the financing, construction and operation of a 
civic auditorium is a municipal purpose, then Article 
11, Section 5 is violated. 
If the civic auditorium is a county affair, then Ar-
ticle 6, Section 26 (11) is violated. 
If the civic auditorium is neither a municipal purpose 
nor a county affair, then Article 6, Section 26 (16) is 
violated because a franchise is given. 
Regardless of whether a civic auditorium is a munici-
pal purpose, a county affair or whether or not a fran-
chise was granted, there is an over-all prohibition of a 
special law when ''a general law can be applicable". Cer-
tainly the Legislature could have had a general law ap-
plicable to counties regardless of population. 
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In State vs. Standford, 24 U. 148, 66 P. 1061, 1064 
an act providing for agricultural inspectors for counties 
having 5,000 or more fruit trees and further providing 
that in counties having a population of over 20,000 depu-
ties could be appointed, it was held that the act w.as 
unconstitutional because it did not have uniform opera-
tion throughout the state. The Court said: 
''The state legislature is forbidden to pass 
any private or special laws regUlating county af-
fairs. The laws enacted must be uniform gener-
ally, and applicable to all of the counties through-
out the state. In Welsh v. Bramlet, supr.a, it is 
said: 'Whenever it attempts to enact a law for one 
or more of the counties of the state upon subjects 
that it is directed to provide for by general laws, 
or which are to form part of a uniform system 
for the whole state, whethe:r such counties are 
designated directly by name, or by reference to 
a class into which they have be·en placed for other 
subjects of legislation, it infringes these provi-
sions of the constitution. We must. take judicial 
knowledge that there is only one county in the 
state whose population places it in the eighth 
class, and, if an act is passed by the legislature 
that is applicable to only one county in the state, 
it does not cease to be local by reason of the fact 
that it purports to be applicable to a class of coun-
ties which the legislature is not authorized to 
create for the purpose of such legislation, and of 
which that county constitutes the only member.' " 
Although the Lehi case (supra) discussed whether 
or not the act was a "special law," there was no popu-
lation requirement for the creation of a water district 
and therefore the Lehi case is not applicable here, except 
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that the following language from the majority opinion 
(p. 536) indicates that the decision might have been dif-
ferent had the act not applied to all counties. The Court 
said: 
''The act is not limited to any particular cities 
or towns, or to .any particular locality in the state, 
but it operates uniformly on every city or town 
which may choose to truke advantage of its provi-
sions. In form, as well as in substance, it is a gen-
eral law and not special." 
POINT V. 
THE 10% DEBT LIMITATION WOULD VIOLATE AR-
TICLE 14, SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THE STATE CONSTITU-
TION. (APPELLANT'S POINT III.) 
Said sections provide, in part, as follows : 
"Sec. 3. No debt in excess of the taxes for 
the current year shall be created by any county 
or subdivis~on thereof, or by any school district 
therein, or by any city, town or village, or any sub-
division thereof in this state; unless the proposi-
tion to create such debt, shall have been submitted 
to a vote of such qualified electors as shall have 
paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding 
such election, and a majority of those voting there-
on shall have voted in favor of incurring such 
debt.11 
"Sec. 4. When authorized to create tndebte.d-
nes as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no 
county shall become indebted to an amount, in-
cludivng exist.ing indebtedness exceeding two per-
centum. No city, town, school district or other 
municipal corporation, shall become indebted to 
an amount, including existing indebtedness, ex-
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ceeding fou.r per centum of the value of the tax-
able property therein . . . " 
The act provides for a limitation on the district debt 
(not including any county debt) of 10% (11-11-13(6) ). 
District areas coincide with county areas (11-11-3). 
If the Legislature, by the mere subterfuge of saying that 
the county constitutes a district, can avoid the 2% limita-
tion of indebtedness upon counties, then the above sec-
tions are emasculated. The Legislature could then de-
clare that the county constituted any number of districts 
and thereby create ·enough taxing units that the result 
could be any amount of indebtedness even up to 100%. 
If these constitutional sections are given effect, the total 
of authorized indebtedness of the county and any dis-
trict which is coterminous with the county should not 
exceed 2%. 
Furthermore, if it be determined as discussed under 
Point I that the district is a municipal corporation (in-
stead of a special commission, private corporation or 
association) then the 4% limitation would be applicable. 
Such a 4% limitation would be violated by (11-11-13(6) ) 
permitting indebtedness up to 10%. 
The majority opinion in the Lehi case (supra) (p. 
541) solved this problem by the simple expedient of de-
claring that a district was a "quasi municipal" body. The 
decision then reasoned that it has some attributes of a 
municipal corporation but does not have to comply with 
the limitations placed by the constitution on such cor-
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porations. The concurring opinion of Judge Wolfe (p. 
549) concludes that the function of the district is pro-
prietary, not governmental. He somehow concludes there-
from that this takes the district out of the classification 
of a "municipal corporation". The dissent (p. 553) logie-
ally argues that: 
"The ·Constitution of Utah provides for the 
organization, management, and operation of two 
classes of corporations, viz., municipal corpora-
tions, and private corporations. For the Legisla-
ture or the courts by supplying a different ad-
jective modifier to the word 'corporation,' and 
thereby bringing about a new hybrid entity that 
is neither municipal nor private within the pur-
view of the terms of the Utah Constitution, ap-
peals as a refinement. It is an easy method to 
avoid the plan terms of the State Constitution. 
If constitutional limitations may thus by a proc-
ess of definition be eliminated, evaded, or evapo-
rated out of the Constitution, the stabilizing 
purposes and restraints of Constitutions intended 
to tide the people over periods of emergency, ex-
citement, or trouble until calm reflection may 
analyze· and measure the needs, will cease to ac-
complish the purposes for which they are in-
tended." 
POINT VI. 
THE CREATION OF A TAXING UNIT WITH LITTLE 
NOTICE MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7, OF THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
(APPELLANT'S POINT IV.) 
·Article 1, Section 7, of the State Constitution pro-
vides: 
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"Sec. 7. No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the ·Constitution of 
the United States provides, in part: 
• 'No State shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law ... " 
The provisions as to notice for the holding of the 
first election are that a notice ''shall be published once 
at least ten days before the date of the election ... and 
no other or further notice of such election ... or polling 
places need be given or made" (11-11-6). 
Furthermore, the above provision for notiee (11-11-
6) is ambiguous in that it says that notice shall be "pub-
lished in each county within the proposed Civic Audi-
torium and Sports Arena District" implying that there 
may be more than one county. 
The provision for notice of the election on the propo-
sition of bonded indebtedness is similar. It provides for 
one publication ten days before the election or, if there 
is no newspaper, posting in three public places at least 
ten days before the election (11-11-18). 
If such publication is inadequate either as to time 
or manner of giving notice, then the act would be uncon-
stitutional. 
A similar provision as to notice was held constitu-
tional in the Lehi case (supra), however. 
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POINT VII 
A THREE MONTH LIMITATION PERIOD MAY VIO-
LATE ARTICLE I, SE·CTION 7, OF THE STATE CONSTI-
TUTION AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STTT'UTION OF THE UNITED STATE1S. (APPELLANT'S 
POINT V.) 
IV. 
The Constitutional provisions are set out in Point 
Section 11-11-12 of the Act provides, in part: 
"The validity of the incorporation of any 
such district shall be incontestable in any suit or 
proceeding which shall not have been commenced 
within three months from the date of issuance of 
the certificate of incorporation thereof; . . ." 
If a three month limitation is an unreasonably short 
period, then the provision would be unconstitutional. 
The cases as to reasonableness of the period of time 
are many and varied as to time limitations which have 
been approved or disapproved, but a three month period 
is about the minimum time which decisions have upheld. 
34 Amerioan Jurispntdence, Limitation of Actions, Pars. 
25, 26. 
This question was not raised in the Lehi case 
(supra). 
POINT VIII. 
TH~ MANNER OF HOLDING ELECTIONS MAY VIO-
LA'TE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2, OF THE STATE CONSTI-
TUTION. (APPELLANT',S POINT VI.) 
Article 1, Section 2, provides : 
''Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in 
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the people; and all free governments are founded 
on their authority for their equal protection and 
benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
their government as the public welfare may re-
quire." 
·The act provides for the voting on the creation of 
a district during a municipal election (11-11-3). It pro-
vides for elections in years in which there is a municipal 
election and not an election in the unincorporated areas 
of the county, thereby creating a likelihood that a greater 
percentage of residents in incorpoi"ated areas of the coun-
ty will vote on the matter of a municipal auditorium, 
because they will be at the polls for various matters in 
which they have an interest. 'This is particularly true in 
view of the fact that elections in the unincorporated areas 
of the county probably would be conducted in a consoli-
dated district, which would reduce the number of voters. 
This question was not raised in the Lehi case 
(supra). 
POINT IX. 
EXEMPTION OF AN AUDITORIUM FROM TAXATION 
MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 13, SECTION 10, OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT'S POINT VIII.) 
Said section provide's : 
"Sec. 10. All corporations or persons in this 
State, or doing business herein, shall be subject 
to taxation for State, County, School, Municipal 
or other purposes, on the real .and personal prop-
erty owned or used by them within the Territorial 
li1nits of the authority levying the tax." 
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Although there is no specific exemption in the act, it 
is apparent that the act contemplates that the auditorium 
will not be subject to property tax. If the district is not 
subject to the debt limitation of a municipal corporation 
(Point V), then a property tax exemption for the audi-
torium would violate the above section of the constitution. 
This question was not raised in the Lehi case 
(supra). 
POINT X. 
SOME PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ARE NOT ·CLEARLY 
EXPRESSED IN 'THE TITLE WHICH MAY VIOLATE AR-
TICLE 6, SECTION 23, OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. 
(APPELLANT'S POINT IX.) 
Said section provides : 
"Sec. 23. Except general appropriation bills, 
and bills for the codification and general revision 
of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more 
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed 
in its title." 
The title of the act is as follows 
"TITLE OF ACT. 
"An act providing for the incorporation, 
government and management of civic auditorium 
and sports arena districts, authorizing such dis-
trict to incur bonded debt and to acquire, 
construct, operate and manage properties and 
facilities for sports events, conventions, cultural 
exhibits and shows, public meetings ;and other 
similar purposes; providing for the taxation of 
property therein and the performance of certain 
functions relating thereto by officers of cities of 
the first class or counties." 
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The above title does not include the subject matter 
contained within two sections providing for actions to 
determine the validity of bonds, etc., and providing that 
bonds shall be legal investments, and valid security. 
·The headings of the two sections are as follows: 
"11-11-25. A!CTION TO DE. TERMINE 
VALIDITY OF BONDS, CONTRACTS, CON-
TRACT OBLIGATIONS, OR IND·EBTEDNESS 
OR SUFFICIENCY OF PROVISIONS FOR 
ANNUAL T'AX - JURISDICTION OF DIS-
TRICT COURT - JUDGMEN'T- APPEAL-
PROCEDURE - COSTS." 
"11-11-29. BONDS TO BE LEGAL IN-
VEST'MEN·TS - USE AS SECURITY FOR 
FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF ACTS." 
This question was not raised in the Lehi case 
(supra). 
POINT XI. 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE COUNTY CALL AN 
ELE.CTION MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 6, SECTION 26(11) 
AND ARTICLE 13, SECTION 5, OF THE STATE CONSTI-
TUTION. 
Article 6, Section 26 ( 11) provides as follows : 
''·The legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following cases: 
... 11. Regulating county and township af-
fairs." 
Article 13, Section 5, provides as follows: 
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corpor.ation, but may, by law, vest in 
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the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, 
the power to assess and collect taxes for all pur-
poses of such corporation." 
The act provides that an "election shall be called by 
ordinance by the governing body of each county af-
fected". (11-11-4) 
This is a regulation of county affairs which is valid 
only if the act is a general act applicable to all counties 
and not a special act. 
The requirement that an election be called, with the 
incident requirement of expenditure of funds therefor 
by the county is a determination by the legislature of 
the disposition of county funds which the court said was 
improper in State v. StandfO'r.d 24 U. 148, 66 P. 1061, 
1064 wherein the court said : 
". . . Nor can the state compel a county to 
incur .a debt or to levy a tax for the purpose named 
in the act without its consent." 
There was no such r.equirement that the county call 
an election in the Lehi case supra). 
POINT XII. 
THE ACT HAS NO SAVINGS CLAUSE. 
There is no savings clause in the act providing that 
if part is held unconstitutional the re1nainder shall be 
deemed valid. 
POINT XIII. 
THE ACT IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS. (APPEL-
LANT'S POINT XI.) 
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(a) The act does not provide for the payment of 
expenses of a special election to be called for incorpora-
tion of the district (11-11-3) nor who shall bear the ex-
pense of the election and notice thereof if held with the 
general election (11-11-5, 11-11-6) nor who shall bear the 
expense of the election on the proposition of incurring 
indebtedness (11-11-18) after a district is formed. The 
latter situation would pose a particularly difficult prob-
lem if at the election on the proposition of incurring 
indebtedness a negative vote resulted. 
If the county has to bear the expense of any of the 
elections, this may be unconstitutional as pointed out 
under Point IX. 
(b) Section 3 of said act provides that an election 
to determine whether said districts should be incor-
porated shall be called "at the next succeeding Municipal 
Election following the passage of this act". Salt Lake 
County refused to call such election and no such election 
occurred at the next succeeding municipal election, hut 
Salt Lake County has now called an election thereon at 
the next general election. Said act is not clear as to 
whether the election can properly be called at tlie next 
succeeding general election or whether it should be called 
at the next succeeding municipal election, or whether an 
election can be called at all. 
(c) Section 11-11-31 requires the levy of taxes suf-
ficent to meet interest and sinking fund requirements. 
This conflicts with Section 11-11-13(7) which limits the 
amount of taxes. 
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(d) Various sections imply that a district may con-
stitute more than one county (11-11-6, 11-11-32), whereas 
11-11-2 provides that one county shall constitute a 
district. 
(e) 11-11-15 provides for a board of nine members, 
three of whom shall be appointed by the city of the first 
class. If there is no city of the first class, there is no 
provision as to the size of the board. 
CONCLUSION 
The most difficult constitutional problems appear to 
be the following: 
The district may be a "special commission" in which 
event, since it has the power to tax, it has unconstitutional 
powers. 
The district would have constitutional powers to tax 
only if classified as a "municipal corporation''. A muni-
cipal corporation has a limitation of a debt of 4% which 
this act exceeds. 
The auditorium district is coterminous with the 
county area, and the creation of a separate political body 
with power to levy taxes for the construction of a munici-
pal building, seems to be a subterfuge whereby the 
county's 2% debt limitation is ignored. 
~The act applies only to counties of 250,000 in popu-
lation. There is no reason to discriminate against smaller 
counties which might want the same power to go above 
their debt limit that Salt La:ke 'County thereby obtains. 
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Other counties may be also interested in tourism and con-
ventions even though they are not so populous as Salt 
Lake County. The act is therefore a special act without 
uniform operation. 
A county with the necessary population is required, 
rather than authorized, to hold an election to determine 
whether a district shall be created. This is a regulation 
of county affairs and is a requirement that a particular 
county spend its taxes for an election. 
rrhe levying of taxes by Salt Lake County for the 
construction and operation of a municipal building should 
be a matter for county determination and control rather 
than for determination and control by an independent 
political body. 
The title of the act does not refer to the validity of 
bonds nor the use that can be made of them. 
The act is vague. 
The act if constitutional should be construed as to 
various vague portions thereof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brayton, Lowe & Hurley 
Frank E. Diston 
John W. Lowe 
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